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Comments and Casenotes
THE "LORD MANSFIELD RULE" AS TO
"BASTARDIZING THE ISSUE"
Harward v. Harward'

Hale v. State2

In the first principal case plaintiff-appellee-husband filed
a bill of complaint against defendant-appellant-wife in
which he charged that her cruel and vicious temper and
threats of violence compelled him to leave their joint abode.
He further alleged that his wife had committed the crime
of adultery, and as a result of said adultery a female child,
the father unknown, was born of her on July 22, 1935. He
alleged that he had not had sexual intercourse with his wife
since his departure from their joint abode in July, 1934.
The wife denied these charges and at the trial the husband
offered no testimony, other than his own, to support his allegations. There was evidence that on several occasions after
the appellee's departure in July, 1934, the couple were together in the Fall of that year, at which times there might
have been opportunity for intercourse. The evidence of
the wife as to when the last instance of intercourse occurred
was very hazy, and the testimony of the husband was obscure and misleading as to dates, and, on his own admission,
inaccurate. The appellee in the court below made a motion
to strike out the husband's testimony as to non-access to
his wife after July, 1934. This motion was refused. The
trial court granted the appellee a divorce a vinulo matrimonii and the wife appealed. Held: Decree reversed and
bill dismissed. The motion to strike out the testimony of
the husband as to non-access to his wife, within the period
in which conception might have occurred, should have been
granted. The court reaffirmed the existence of "Lord
Mansfield's Rule" in Maryland and used the language of
Dean Wigmore' to the effect that the doctrine was, in many
jurisdictions, "too deeply planted to be uprooted".
In the second principal case, Hale, the appellant, was
presented in the Criminal Court for Baltimore City for bastardy. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The court sit1 196 At. 318 (Md. 1938).
2 Atl. (2d) 17 (Md. 1938).
3 Wigmore, Evidence. Se. 2063.
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ting as a jury found a verdict of guilty, and upon motion
a new trial was granted. Upon the second trial the court
again found him guilty. During the course of this trial it
was shown that the mother of the child was a married
woman, and was married to another man at the time of the
conception of the child whose parentage was in question.
To meet the requirement of proof as to non-intercourse between her and her husband, her mother, who lived four doors
down the street from her, testified that the daughter and her
husband had been separated for three years, and that she
had never seen or heard of him associating with his wife
during that time. The daughter's sister-in-law, with whom
she had lived from the middle of 1936 until June, 1937, when
she went to live with defendant, also testified that during
that time she had been with her day and night and had never
seen her with her husband. Several other witnesses who
were intimate friends offered similar testimony. Subsequent to the admission of the above testimony, the mother
of the child was allowed to testify to the non-access of her
husband and as to the relations between her and Hale, who
was named by her as father of the child. This testimony
was objected to, and its admissibility was in question on appeal, held: Affirmed. The Court said:
"We think the rule if not already established by the
decisions in this State, should be, that when non-intercourse is shown to the trial court, by clear satisfying
and convincing evidence, then the mother should be held
competent to testify as to her relations with the accused
and to disclose the identity of the father of her child."
The greater part of the discussion which follows will
deal with the Harward case, as we feel that the treatment
of that case raises many of the problems which are kindred
to the Hale case, and the discussion of one will throw light
upon the other.
The Harward case leads us to a consideration of Lord
Mansfield's Rule", and the relative merits concerning its
retention in the law today. The rule as stated by Lord
Mansfield in Goodright Ex. d. Steve.ns v. Moss,' is: "As to
the time of birth, the father and mother are the most proper
witnesses to prove it. But it is a rule founded in decency,
morality, and policy, that they shall not be permitted to say
after marriage, that they had no connection, and therefore
that the offspring is spurious,". Today most courts tersely
2 Cowp. 291, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
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phrase it to the effect that after marriage, neither spouse
may testify to the non-access of the other during that period
when conception might have occurred, so as to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy.
A brief sketch of the historical background of "Lord
Mansfield's Rule" will aid us in accurately appraising the
true value of the rule in the law of evidence today.
It has always been a well settled rule of the common law
that a child born in wedlock is presumed to be legitimate.5
At early common law this presumption could only be overcome by evidence of non-access, and the law was most strict
as to the nature of this evidence of non-access, the limitations of this rule being quaintly phrased by Lord Blackstone,6 "As if the husband be out of the kingdom of England,
or, as the law somewhat loosely phrases it, extra quatuor
maria, for above nine months, so that no access to his wife
can be presumed, her issue during that period shall be bastards." Quite obviously it was only on rare occasions when
the extrinsic circumstances were such as required by this
rule, i. e., the husband being beyond the seas.
At first, the only objection to the testimony of the husband
and wife as to non-access to the other, seemed to rest on the
interest rule, disqualifying the husband and wife to testify
against each other. However around the middle of the seventeenth century the courts began to permit the wife to
testify to the non-access of the husband, if her testimony
was corroborated." But in 1777, Lord Mansfield in Goodright v. Moss,' made his remarkable statement, refusing to
allow either spouse to testify as to non-access, for which
as Wigmore calls attention,9 "If there is any such law of
England or was any for any period, it was invented by him
and dates from his utterance".
In the early part of the nineteenth century "Lord Mansfield's Rule" found its way into the law of this country and
courts seemed to rival one another in adopting it."0 In the
first principal case of Harward v. Harward the Maryland
Court of Appeals seemed to feel that "Lord Mansfield's
Rule" was deeply imbedded in the law of this State, citing
51

Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Sec. 64.
1 Blackstone's Commentaries, Lewis ed., 457.
' Rex. v. Reading, Cas. t. Hardwick 79, 94 Eng. Rep. 1113 (1734) : Rex v.
Bedel, Cas. t. Hardwick 379, 95 Eng. Rep. 245 (1737) ; Rex v. Luffe, 8 East
193, 101 Eng. Rep. 316 (1807).
8 Supra note 4.
Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2063.
10 Canton v. Bently, 11 Mass. 441 (1841) ; Corson v. Corson, 44 N. H. 587
(1863) ; Cuss v. Cuss, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139 (1832).
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Crauford v. Blackburn" and Scanlon v. Walshe," as authority. It is interesting to note that, in the former case, the
court stated the rule merely by way of dictum, and in the
latter case, although the rule was applied, yet there was an
element of estoppel present, which of itself would seem to
have justified the decision of the court. The plaintiff, Charlote Walshe had some twenty years before secured a divorce
on the grounds of adultery against her former husband, alleging at that time that the children which she subsequently
sought to illegitimate, were his. Consequently one wonders
whether or not the Court in the Harwardcase was over zealous in reaffirming the rule in Maryland.
Lord Mansfield in stating the rule said that it was
"founded in decency, morality, and policy"." There has
been much conjecture and speculation as to just what he
meant by that statement. In the most recent case in England reaffirming his rule, Russel v. Russel, 4 Lord Dunedin
construed it in the following manner, "The decency that
Lord Mansfield referred to was the decency before all the
world of laying bare the most secret, and, at the same time,
the most sacred of the legitimate relations of man and
woman as husband and wife". This clearly places it within
what, in the common parlance of men, would be regarded as
"decency". Following this argument another prominent
writer, Jones, has said, 5 "It is founded upon the policy of
the law which forbids either husband or wife to testify to
occurrences between them during marriage, also upon its
supreme regard for those privileges of the married state
that all men instinctively withhold from public knowledge."
From the above authorities the conclusion is forced that
a close analogy must then exist between "Lord Mansfield's
Rule" and the privilege extended to the "confidential communications" between husband and wife. They both can be
catalogued under the same "public policy" argument, and
the courts have used much fustian language, regarding the
inadmissibility of the testimony of spouses as to non-access.
It is suggested however that there is a recent trend in
judicial decisions which has the effect of cutting short this
analogy between "Lord Mansfield's Rule" and "confidential communications" between husband and wife. To use
the vernacular, many courts have done much toward "dell17

Md. 49 (1860).

181 Md. 118 (1895).
18 Supra, note 4.
14 (1924) A. C. 726.

155 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Sec. 339.

1938]

THE "LORD MANSFIELD RULE"

bunking" the "public policy" argument urged in favor of
the rule. "Confidential communications" cannot, as we
know, be divulged on the witness stand, either during the
existence of the marriage or after its termination by death
or divorce. 6 This marks the demarcation where the analogy
fails, as recent cases have shown a tendency toward allowing the testimony of a spouse as to non-access to the other,
when such testimony will not bastardize the issue. A case
which seems to strike directly at the "decency" angle, is
that of Melvin v. Melvin, 7 a New Hampshire case, wherein
the court admitted the testimony as to non-access of the
husband to the wife, because there was no issue involved,
and hence no chance to bastardize any issue, it being simply
a divorce proceeding. Hence we see that this evidence as
to non-access may be allowed either before or after dissolution of the marriage, when no question of bartardizing the
issue is involved.
In Fosdike v. Fosdike,8 a case decided a year after Rus9 the court held that the testimony of the hussel v. Russel,"
band as to the non-access to his wife, was admissible to dissolve the marriage bonds because the issue resulted in a
miscarriage, and consequently there was no question of bastardizing it.
In a Michigan case, In re Wright,2 0 the facts presented
were similar to the facts of the Maryland case of Scanlon
v. Walshe.' In the Wright case, Lloyd Wright filed a suit
for the partition of the property of J. Edwin Wright whom
he alleged to be his father. Lloyd's mother, Mrs. Wright,
testified to the fact that Lloyd was her son by J. Edwin
Wright and that he had been born to her while she was
married to one Raby, and that the latter had had no access
to her prior to birth of issue, and that she had married
Wright after Raby divorced her. The Michigan court admitted the testimony and claimed that the test should be
whether or not the issue would be bastardized by such testimony, and that since at common law a man legitimated his
issue by marrying the mother, that Lloyd Wright was legitimated by the marriage of his mother to Wright, even though
born while his mother was in coverture with Raby. It is
advanced that the Maryland Court might well have used
such reasoning in Scanlon v. Walshe, because in that case,
16Ibid,

Sec. 2143.
58 N. H. 569, 42 Am. Rep. 605 (1879).
18 159 L. T. J. (Eng.) 95, 60 A. L. R. 384 (1925).
10 Supra note 14.
20 237 Mich. 375, 221 N. W. 746 (1927).
2 Supra note 12.
17
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even though the children born to Charlotte Walshe were
born while she was married to Florian Simonds, yet the
testimony as to the non-access of Simonds would not have
resulted in the bastardizing of the issue, because she later
married Walshe, the alleged father, and as a result of this
second marriage the children would have been legitimated.
This test of whether the evidence of non-access by the
spouse tends to bastardize the issue would certainly limit
the application of "Lord Mansfield's Rule", and evidence
would be admitted only where there was no chance to illegitimate the issue.
Some courts have gone even further in restricting the application of the rule, and allow the testimony of the spouse
as to the non-access of the other, where such testimony, although having a bearing on the legitimacy of the issue, yet
does not directly bastardize the issue. A few illustrations
by way of cases explain its application. In Koffman v.
Koffman,2 the Massachusetts court held, that in a divorce
proceeding by the husband, against his wife on the grounds
of the wife's adultery, that the husband could testify as to
non-access to his wife to dispell the defense of condonation
which she set up, even though such testimony might indirectly prove the illegitimacy of the offspring. The court
did, however, say that the evidence so given in the divorce
proceeding, although insufficient for proving adultery, would
not be competent in a proceeding to bastardize the child.
The court contended that they were separable issues. Mulligan v. Thompson.2 an Ontario case, used similar reasoning
in a seduction proceeding, and likewise did Bancroft v. Bancroft, 4 a Delaware case, where letters of the wife were admitted showing non-access of the husband. The Court said:
"We are clearly of the opinion that they cannot be excluded
on the ground that they also tend to prove the issue of the
child's illegitimacy." Again in this instance the court
stated that in issuing their decree of illegitimacy it did not
take the evidence established by the letters into consideration, but limited the admissibility of the letters to the divorce
proceedings.
Clearly these cases have made progress in limiting the
application of "Lord Mansfield's Rule", and it is a limitation which should be encouraged, for such limitation restricts the rule to bastardy cases, and decrees from the
Orphans' Court establishing illegitimacy, that is to say, it
"193 Mass. 593, 79 N. E. 780 (1907).
"322 Ont. Rep. 54, 60 A. L. R. 384 (1892).
2 4 Boyce 9, 85 At. 561 (1911) ; (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 560.
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curtails its use to those cases in which the bastardization of
Conthe issue is the direct questions before the court.
versely, we may say, it allows the evidence of the spouse as
to non-access to the other, in all proceedings where the bastardizing of the issue is only indirectly involved, or not involved at all. This would render such evidence competent
in divorce proceedings where the husband seeks to establish
the adultery of his wife with an unknown paramour, it would
likewise admit such evidence in a situation such as presented
by Scanlon v. Walshe." It would seem then that the rule
would have been whittled down to its proper limits.
The rule as to testimony of non-access, as it originally
applied to those situations where the husband had been beyond the seas for a period of nine months, has been greatly
relaxed. The bastardization of the issue, even by those jurisdictions which follow "Lord Mansfield's Rule", may be
accomplished by other evidence such as outlined by Lord
Langdale in Hargrave v. Hargrave," that is where the husband proves that he was "(1) incompetent, (2) entirely absent, so as to have no intercourse or communication of any
kind with the mother, (3) entirely absent, at the beginning
of the period during which the child must, in the course of
nature have been begotten, (4) only present, under such
circumstances as afford clear and satisfactory proof that
there was no sexual intercourse." Hale v. State, the second
principal case, would seem to offer proof within the bounds
of Lord Langdale's third and fourth rules. Hence today
the only evidence which is still inadmissible is that of either
spouse as to non-access, and it would seem a step in the right
direction to relax the rule as to this, in keeping with the
suggestions made elsewhere in this note.
As has been previously stated, Lord Mansfield had no
precedent for his statement in Goodright v. Moss, yet the
rule was blindly followed by most jurisdictions in the belief
that it served some vague and nebulous public policy, which
they all felt existed but were at odds as to just what it was.
Dean Wigmore wrote a vitriolic criticism of the rule in his
work ,onEvidence, exposing the fallacy in the public policy
argument based on "decency", which so many courts urged
for the rule's justification. Wigmore states27 "In every
sort of action whatever, a wife may testify to adultery or
a single woman to illicit intercourse, yet the one fact singled
out as 'indecent' is the fact of non-access on the part of a
2"3Supra note 12.
269 Beav. 553, 50 Eng. Rep. 546 (1846).
21 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2064.
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husband. Such an inconsistency is obviously untenable."
Wigmore also convincingly points out that even if the salient
purpose of the rule is considered by many courts not to be
the preservation of "decency", but rather to prevent the
bastardizing of the issue, that even this end is not served,
because the issue may be bastardized by other evidence.2 8
The Kansas Court 9 was the first jurisdiction emphatically and without reserve to overthrow "Lord Mansfield's
Rule", and the Court from its decision shows that it was
obviously influenced by Wigmore 's caustic condemnation of
the rule. New York, Montana, and New Jersey 0 have quite
recently abrogated the rule by statute, while many other
courts, as previously stated, although not overthrowing the
rule, have limited it, thereby restricting its effectiveness.8
In conclusion it would seem that the limitation of "Lord
Mansfield's Rule" to bastardy charges and decrees of illegitimacy issuing from the Orphans' Court, would allow the
admission of testimony in divorce proceedings which would
be of real assistance in arriving at the justice of the case.
To be sure no one would argue that such evidence of itself
should be sufficient to prove the non-access, but corroboration should be required.
The situation can easily be imagined, wherein the wife
being estranged from the husband, and finding herself pregnant by another man, might arrange a private meeting with
her husband in a secluded spot (from which it could be
argued that the opportunity for intercourse might have occurred) and thus seal the husband's lips upon this vital subject. The injustice caused by such a rule in refusing to
allow the husband to testify as to what occurred is obvious.
During the course of this note, we have argued for a
limitation or abolishment of Lord Mansfield's Rule, but it
may be well to call attention to the fact that whether or not a
court feels disposed to adopt such a limitation to Lord Mansfield's Rule, or retain it, it does not in any way affect the
principle involved in Hale v. State, for as pointed out by the
Maryland Court of Appeals, there is nothing inconsistent
between that case and Lord Mansfield's Rule. In the Harward case, which follows the rule, the testimony of the
21 Supra note 2; State v. Bosley, The Daily Record, Nov. 4, 1938 (Ct. Ct.
for Baltimore Co.).
39 Stille v. Stille, 115 Kan. 420, 223 Pac. 281 (1924) ; Lynch v. Rosenberg,
121 Kan. 601, 249 Pac. 682 (1926).
80 Public Welfare Comm. v. Zizzo, 236 App. Dlv. 813, 260 N. Y. S. 169
(1932) ; In re Wray, 93 Mont. 525, 19 Pac. (2d) 1051 (1933); Louden v.
Louden, 114 N. J. E. 242, 168 At. 840 (1933).
8

Supra note 22.
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wife as to non-access was held inadmissible because the fact
of non-access had not been clearly proven by other clear and
convincing extrinsic evidence, whereas in the Hale case,
prior to the testimony of the wife, the fact of non-access had
been clearly and convincingly proven by extrinsic evidence.
The Hale case was not one of first impression in this
State, as the case of Howell v. Howell," was considered by
the court to have established the rule. In the Howell case
the question did not arise by virtue of a bastardy charge,
but on a suit brought by the wife for separate maintenance
of herself and child.
Lord Langdale's rules regarding the necedsary proof for
non-access as established in the Harwick case,8 and Bishop
on Marriage, 4 indicate that all that is required is proof of
non-access by testimony other than that of either spouse.
Once this proof has been satisfied there is nothing to be
gained from further silence on the part of the spouses.
DOES THE DELAY INCIDENT TO THE USE OF
THE CLEARING HOUSE EXTEND THE REASONABLE TIME FOR THE PRESENT.
MENT OF A CHECK?
Maryland Title Guarantee Co. v. Alter 1
In connection with a transaction for the purchase of
some real estate the defendant-appellee gave the plaintiffappellant a check on the 23rd of February 1933. The check,
at the plaintiff's previous request had been certified by the
drawee bank. Since the check was not received until after
banking hours it was not deposited in plaintiff's bank until
the 24th. According to the usual practice, this check was
not presented on the 24th, but would have been presented
through the clearing house on the next day, February 25th,
had not the emergency banking holiday in Maryland intervened. The drawee bank would have made payment on
February 24th, if the check had been presented on that
day, but being insolvent it did not reopen after the banking holiday. The defendant had at all times sufficient money
on deposit with the drawee to cover the check, and all persons involved conducted business within the city of Baltimore. The plaintiff sued on the check and, on appeal from
"2 166 Md. 531, 171 At. 869 (1934).
88 Supra note 26.
", Bishop, Marriages, Secs. 1168-1174.
1167 Md. 245, 173 A. 200 (1934).

